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FIRST DRAFT

NOTE:
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REV

OPERATION PORK CHOP

BASIC CONCEPT

ANNEX "A" - FORCES

ANNEX "B" - MAP

ANNEX "C" - EXECUTION WITH ONLY U.S. FORCES

ANNEX D - CONFERENCE TACTIC IV

SCHEDULE OF OPN PORK CHOP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY [Signature] DATE 6-5-87

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Per 3.23.98
By Dos Review
By Bm/sue LC Date 4/30/98

WORKING DRAFT

OPERATION PORK CHOP

I. Present Situation

- a. A tenuous cease-fire exists in Laos at the sufferance of the Communists.
- b. The next projected step is a political settlement.
- c. The relative strengths of the opposing sides indicates that a political solution will result in a leftist Lao government.
- d. A leftist Lao government will eventually pass under Communist domination.
- e. A Communist-dominated Laos will threaten Southeast Asia politically and militarily and be a serious psychological blow to the Free World.

II. Basic Conclusion

In light of the above, it is not in the U.S. interest to seek a unified Laos.

III. Basic Objective

A divided Laos with non-Communists in firm control of the Mekong River Valley and Southern Laos.

IV. Circumstances of Initiations

- a. Situation 1. The Pathet Lao have breached the cease-fire by offensive action against the FAL and SEATO or U.S./Thai troops have been committed to hold key areas in Laos.
- b. Situation 2. The Conference is unable to reach agreement (as a result of a concealed U.S. intention to achieve a divided Laos) but the cease-fire and ICC operations continue.

V. Political and Military Factors

a. Political Advantages

- (1) Prove to free Asian nations that U.S. is willing to and capable of acting to protect them.
- (2) Demonstrate U.S. willingness to live up to Treaty commitments.
- (3) Validate the SEATO concept.
- (4) Demonstrate to the Neutrals and the Communists a determination to match force with force.

b. Political Disadvantages

- (1) British and French cooperation will be difficult to obtain.
- (2) Some Neutrals may consider "Western intervention" unjustified.
- (3) The Communist Bloc may use the opportunity to create serious problems elsewhere, e.g., Berlin and Iran.

c. Military Advantages

- (1) Occupation of key centers by a non-combat operation.
- (2) Protect a substantial portion of Laos and key movement routes from Communist control.
- (3) Prevent the emergence of a Communist state on the borders of Thailand, Viet Nam and Cambodia.
- (4) Continued occupation of Laos would be likely to result in a strained situation vis a vis the Buddhist, peace-loving Lao people.

d. Military Disadvantages

- (1) Gets U.S. forces involved in an area undesirable from standpoints of terrain, climate, and logistics.
- (2) Causes unbalance of U.S. forces in the Pacific and would require commensurate increase in readiness preparations within the U.S.

- (3) Could lead to involvement with North Viet Nam and Communist China.
- (4) Would create situation from which withdrawal of U.S. forces would be most difficult.

VI. Concept of Operations

- a. Situation 1: SEATO or US/Thai troops which have been moved into Vientiane, Thakhek and Seno will be holding significant terrain features essential to the defense of these areas. See Annex "A", Forces. As the situation develops, Paksane would be occupied by Thai forces. Combined US/SEATO/LAO forces would move to eliminate Pathet Lao pockets, and secure communication routes into Viet Nam and Thailand (Routes 8, 9, and 12). Essential areas over which the combined forces would establish control are shown on the map, Annex "B". Linking these areas with patrols and striking at incursions with helicopter-borne counter-guerrilla forces will permit the combined forces to secure Free Laos against Pathet Lao offensives. The operations would be divided into three phases: occupation of key population centers, reducing the Pathet Lao pockets within Free Laos, and securing of the borders and communication routes. Intensive efforts to train and reorganize the FAL will be continued throughout the operation with a view to achieving a Lao capability for staturization which will permit the withdrawal of US/SEATO forces.
- b. Situation 2: The US and/or SEATO announces that they have no aggressive intent but are moving forces into Laos to protect the Royal Lao Government against further aggression. Forces will be rapidly deployed to Vientiane, Seno, Thakhek and Paksane. Thereafter the concept of operations is the same as for Situation 1.

c. Forces. See Annex "A".

d. Boundaries. See Annex "B".

e. FAL activities: US effort to train and reorganize the FAL would be intensified by an augmented MAAG-Laos during the cease-fire period and after the commitment of US/SEATO forces. Officer and noncommissioned training will be emphasized and

VII. Alternate Concept of Operations

If circumstances require execution of this operation with U.S. forces only, the action can be carried out as described in Annex "C".

VIII. Recommendation

That the U.S. Government adopt the above concept as basic U.S. strategy for halting Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.

ANNEX "A"

SEATO Forces for Operation Pork Chop


<u>Area</u>	<u>Force</u>	<u>Nation</u>
Vientiane	Hq. SEATO Field Force	Combined
	2 Bn Landing Teams	United States
	1 Bn (Reserve)	Pakistan
Seno	1 Brigade	British Commonwealth
Thakhet	1 Bn	Thailand
Paksane	1 Bn	Thailand


Supporting and Reserve Forces

Supporting Naval Forces (Elements of the Fleet)	United States
1 Regt (- 2 Bns)	Thailand
1 Airborne Battle Grp	United States
1 Mobile Air Strike Force	United States
1 Bn	New Zealand
1 Bn	Pakistan
1 Engr Co	Philippine
1 Ftr Squadron	Australia
1 Ftr Squadron	Pakistan
1 Logistic Units	Thailand

Annex "A"

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Annex B

A hand-drawn map of the HAILAND region, which is outlined in black. The map includes several labeled locations: Muang Sakon Nakhon in the north, Maha Sarakham in the center, Muang Yasothon in the northeast, Muang Ubon in the east, Nakhon Ratchasima in the southwest, and Chayaphum in the west. A wavy line, labeled 'PARTITION LINE', runs from the north towards the southwest. To the left of this line are five hand-drawn ovals, each containing a different pattern of lines (diagonal, horizontal, vertical, etc.). To the right of the line are two more ovals, one with horizontal lines and one with vertical lines. The text 'HAILAND' is written across the middle of the map. Below the partition line, the text 'PARTITION LINE DRAWN TO ENCOMPASS STRATEGIC AREAS AND TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF TERRAIN OBSTACLES.' is written in a bold, hand-drawn font.

PHAKET LAO Muang Sakon Nakhon

MEO

INITIAL OBJECTIVES

H A I L A N D

Maha Sarakham

SECONDARY OBJECTIVES

Muang Yasothon

Chayaphum

LAO OR THAI, OBJECTIVES

Muang Ubon

PARTITION LINE

PARTITION LINE DRAWN TO

Nakhon Ratchasima

Sunn

ENCOMPASS STRATEGIC AREAS

AND TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE

OF TERRAIN OBSTACLES.

 International boundary
 Province boundary
 National capital
 Province capital

ANNEX "C"

CONCEPT FOR EXECUTION OF OPERATION PORK CHOP WITH ONLY U.S. FORCES

1. Concept

- a. One U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) consisting of one U.S. Infantry Division, reinforced, (Inf Div), one U.S. Marine Brigade consisting of one Marine Regimental Landing Team (RLT), Marine Air Group (MAG), one Air Force Mobile Strike Force (MSF) consisting of two tactical fighter squadrons, one reconnaissance task force and support elements, and supporting logistic forces deploys rapidly to Laos, Thailand and South Viet Nam and seizes, secures, and defends key areas along the Mekong and in southern Laos. The JTF headquarters and two battalions deploy to Vientiane. The remainder of the division seizes, secures and defends the Thakhek, Savannakhet, Seno and Paksene areas, supported by the MSF operating from appropriate air bases in Thailand. The RLT seizes, secures and defends the Tchepone area supported by the MAG based at an appropriate air base in Viet Nam. Logistic support forces operate from areas in Thailand and South Viet Nam and establish and maintain appropriate logistic installations and facilities to support U.S. and FAL forces.
- b. FAL forces in northern Laos regroup to hold the area adjacent to the Mekong.

2. Force Table

<u>Element</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Source</u>	<u>Destination</u>
Hq JTF	500	Philippines (US Element Hq SFF)	Seno
<u>Army Component</u>	20,000		
Inf Div (-3 BG's)		Hawaii	Seno/Savannakhet
Battle Group		Hawaii	Thakhek
Battle Group		Hawaii	Paksane
Airborne Battle Group (Force Reserve)		Okinawa	Ubon
Combat Support Forces		Okinawa/COMUS	Where required
Logistic Support Forces		Okinawa/COMUS	Where required
<u>Naval Component</u>	6,500		
Brig Hq		Okinawa	
RLT		Okinawa/Afloat	Tchspone/Quang Tri
MAG		Philippines	Northern Viet Nam
Combat Support Forces		Okinawa	Where required
Logistic Support Forces		Okinawa	Where required
<u>Air Force Component</u>	1,000		
Two TFS		PACOM or COMUS	Thai bases
Recon TF (6-8 RF-101 Aircraft)		PACOM or COMUS	Thai bases
Supporting Elements		PACOM or COMUS	Thai bases
<u>TOTAL FORCE STRENGTH:</u>	<u>28,800</u>		

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CONFERENCE ON LAOS
Geneva, May 12, 1961

Conference Tactics in Support of
Operation Park Chop

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Per

DOS 644403-23 P

By PM/PC LC Date 8-9-84

Statement of the Problem:

To determine Conference tactics with respect to Operation Park Chop.

Anticipated Communist Position:

The Communists are in Laos to stay. They will attempt to extend at the Conference their present effective area of control of the entire country by insisting upon a Souvanna Phouma government committed in advance of the Conference to the inclusion of NIEK Ministers and Pathet Lao forces.

Recommended U.S. Position:

The U.S. should maintain at the Conference its overt position that it desires a genuinely neutral and independent Laos, but should privately recognize that this position cannot be attained. The U.S. should therefore have the concealed intention to have the Conference result in an impasse. When the Conference has reached an impasse the U.S. should announce that its commitments require that it deploy U.S. forces, preferably with those of other SEATO nations, within Laos to safeguard that part of Laos that is free.

Discussion:

The U.S. will soon enter a Conference in which a truly neutral and independent Laos cannot be achieved because (1) the NIEK is supporting an NIEK that is extremely weak both politically and militarily, (2) our European allies are unwilling to act decisively to preserve SEATO security interests in Southeast Asia, (3) the U.S. has not yet decided to commit armed forces without British and French participation to save the remainder of Laos.

Concerning the Conference the U.S. has three options:

1. To refuse to attend the Conference.

If there be no cease fire, this is an acceptable course of action. Operation Park Chop provides an adequate response. Given a cease fire, the U.S. cannot adopt refusal to attend the Conference as an acceptable course of action.

2. To seek a negotiated agreement dividing Laos into two states.

This course of action is probably unacceptable because of the negative reaction of SEATO and COMINT members, as well of general world opinion, and because a more acceptable course of action is open to the U.S.

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3. To force the Communists during the Conference refuse unreasonably the normal safeguards for Laos of neutrality and independence which all neutral states require, and to make it clear the U.S. cannot sign an agreement sacrificing these safeguards for Laos.

By quickly asserting its firm intention to provide Laos true neutrality and independence, the U.S. will place the onus upon the Communists for failure to seek for Laos those safeguards necessary for neutrality and independence. As the Communists reveal their actual intentions, it will become clear to the conference that the Communists require a virtual surrender of Laos. There are clear signposts of surrender any one of which will be sufficient to force an impasse upon the Conference:

- a. An IEC whose Terms of Reference include a single member veto.
- b. An RLG headed by Souvanna Phouma which excludes Phoumi and has substantial RLM representation.
- c. Continued Pathet Lao de facto control of all areas it now occupies.
- d. Retention within RLG Armed Forces of Pathet Lao forces whose organizational integrity is retained.

As these signposts are reached the U.S. course of action is to make it clear that the U.S.

- a. Will not agree to the creation of a non-viable, Communist dominated Laos.
- b. Seeks a truly neutral, independent Laos.
- c. Insists the Conference give semi-permanent status to the cease-fire line of demarcation to spare Laos from further bloodshed.

When the Communists refuse these reasonable safeguards, the U.S. will have unmasked the true Communist intentions to continue their aggression in Laos. This refusal of the Communists should stalemate the Conference with the onus placed upon them for the impasse.

Two basic decisions must be made prior to the Conference if the U.S. negotiator is to achieve his objectives:

- a. U.S. interests are better served by a divided Laos than by the unified kind of Laos that could be achieved.
- b. The U.S. will commit forces, without U.K. and France - if necessary, to protect the remainder of Laos, and Thailand and South Vietnam.

These two prior decisions rest upon the Laos the Communists are likely to achieve if the U.S. agree to force the Pathet Lao, the RLM, and Souvanna Phouma into the same government with the RLG. The Communist position will include:

1. Recognition of Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister, free to compose his own cabinet and to rest his position upon the integrity of FL forces,

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excluding Gen. Phoumi and other nationalists.

2. Early withdrawal of U.S. military and economic advisers.
3. Neutral Laos guaranteed by outside Powers, including Communist China and North Vietnam.
4. Retention by HKS and the Pathet Lao of actual authority over the ground they now fully and partially occupy.
5. Amnesty for PL and HKS and right to engage in governmental and political activity.
6. Acceptance of a weak ICSC restricted in authority and numbers to the state of previous weakness, but present and able to give semblance of international approval.
7. Prescription by HKS of right to constitute a new Military Mission before the old Military Mission withdraws.

On the other hand, a divided Laos tacitly agreed upon but not negotiated by the Conference would accomplish the following:

1. Protect the borders of Thailand and South Vietnam.
2. Retain a part of Laos under an HKS which is diplomatically free to accept SEATO or US economic, diplomatic, and military assistance.
3. Gain time to improve US position in Southeast Asia.
4. Honor our treaty commitments.
5. Assure Asiatic powers US has done all it can to preserve Laotians from Communism.
6. Protect Laotian friends from complete annihilation.
7. Force Souvanna Phouma to opt openly to remain with his communist supporters.

From the above it is clear that a divided Laos is preferable to a negotiated, pro-Communist, unified Laos. The military situation on the ground necessitates taking the second decision: to execute Operation Fork Chop. The Pathet Lao have almost won a military victory. Should the Conference be stalemated and no further force be added to the present military balance of forces in Laos, the Pathet Lao can proceed to victory.

Therefore, the military situation requires U.S. adoption of the decision to execute Operation Fork Chop at such time as the Conference makes Communist intentions clear.

With these two primary decisions taken before the Conference, the U.S. negotiator can then proceed during the Conference to execute the Recommended U.S. Position stated above.

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